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Introduction
The Communist Manifesto is, by definition, a polemical treatise. The word polemic stems from the Greek polemikos, meaning ‘war’, and the Manifesto presents itself, accordingly, as the exposé of a ‘more or less hidden civil war’ between social classes and exhorts its readers to take sides with the participant whose interests it promotes.​[1]​ These features of the text are sufficient to remind us that Marx and Engels are engaged in a distinctively rhetorical exercise. Their task in the Manifesto is to supply arguments that define the prevailing situation and, thereby, to persuade their audience to adopt and uphold a position in relation to it. The text achieves this by a combination of arguments that narrate a story, populate that story with characters, identify and explain its central dramatic conflict, ridicule opponents, deliberate over alternative strategies and, finally, exhort a rallying call-to-arms. The Manifesto is not just a treatise on politics; its arguments are its politics.

In this chapter I examine the rhetorical dimensions of the Manifesto. That involves thinking about the text as an assemblage of argumentative strategies designed to capture its audience’s attention, reason with them about the current circumstances, and orient their allegiance to a specific cause. Here rhetoric is understood not merely as the formal or literary aspects of discourse but, more expansively, as an effort to intervene in a situation in order to shift people’s perceptions and adjust their actions.​[2]​ In the Manifesto, Marx and Engels accomplish this through a variety of rhetorical strategies; in particular, by appeals to reason (logos) and to character (ethos). Together these appeals fashion a combative, ironic style that privileges the text’s distinctive stance and casts its reasoning in an unabashed, partisan light. Here the Communist Manifesto follows many of the generic conventions of the manifesto format that emerged from the French revolution: articulating an impatient rage by refusing conciliation with the present order. Its distinctive rhetoric supplies the text with an intellectual depth and creative verve that, although occasioned by a particular set of circumstances, have allowed it to speak beyond its original setting. Indeed, the Manifesto has become itself a ‘rhetoric’, in the sense of a sourcebook of repeatable argumentative topoi and aphorisms available for application elsewhere. If that is a sign of its historical success as a text, it is nonetheless also a weakness. The Manifesto’s rhetoric exhibits a highly motivated sense of its own authority and a singular clarity of purpose that, for Marxists, has been difficult to square with other theoretical and organisational commitments.

Rhetoric as Political Action
Let us begin by asking what it means to talk of rhetoric as a type of political action. As the name for the ancient art of speech and persuasion, in recent centuries rhetoric has been dismissed as the practice of deceit and manipulation, that is, as language fashioned simply to lure people into believing something their reason would caution them against.​[3]​ But ancient scholars did not understand rhetoric that way. For them, it was the central skill in civic life. Certainly it could involve manipulation and, often, deceit, but only because that is a feature of all human association. In fact, most respected rhetoricians (such as Aristotle or Cicero) recommended telling the truth and using words to illuminate rather than obscure matters. What they also accepted, however, was that the truth was never easy to find in all cases, especially in politics or law. Most political and legal disputes don’t admit to a single, absolutely final resolution. There are usually different sides to a debate and other ways of explaining apparent wrongdoing or law breaking. At such moments, it may be necessary to deliberate over the advantages and disadvantages of a policy or allow opposed parties to set out their cases. Civic life in ancient Greece and Rome was uniquely organised around public platforms that offered opportunities for disagreements to unfold, where citizens could debate the common good and permit others to shape their judgements through rousing oratory and artful dispute.​[4]​ 

To be a citizen in classical Greece and Rome was to be prepared not only to fight for one’s community but also to participate in public debates, citizen juries, or political assemblies by listening and arguing. That required access to a rhetorical education, or at very least handy instruction, comprised of the various techniques of argument. Citizens were taught how to select the right kind of appeal for the issue and for the occasion, how to arrange speech in a coherent way, elements of style including figures and tropes, advice for the best delivery and techniques to memorise their case. Rhetoricians taught how to argue from both sides (in umtramque partem) so as to be prepared to refute an opponent’s case, how to utilise ‘commonplaces’ (that is, commonly agreed values and sayings) to make an argument seem reasonable, how to adapt to the audience’s expectation (decorum), and so on.​[5]​

From a contemporary perspective, rhetoric can be understood as a form of ‘situated speech’. That is, it is a means to present an argument by deliberately crafting it for a specific issue, audience and occasion. The techniques and devices of ancient rhetorical instruction describe different manoeuvres to help shape an audience’s judgement. To bring the audience to a preferred conclusion speakers adopt strategies (that is, they calculate in advance which steps to follow) that, at least in part, adjust the argument to prevailing expectations and values. That way the audience hears something it recognises, something that speaks to its preconceptions about the situation it faces. But the argument usually has to transform the audience’s judgements, not simply affirm their prejudices, by demonstrating through its own reasoning that the situation should be conceived one way rather than another. In this respect, the speaker (or rhetor) has to find a creative way to re-situate the issue such that it conforms to her preferred conclusions. That typically involves a creative but also selective redescription of events so as to enhance certain aspects over others, foregrounding some qualities of the issue or ascribing motivations to behaviour, in order to constrain the kind of judgement that audiences will make. The numerous techniques of rhetoric are therefore designed for the purposes of appropriating a situation such that an audience will judge it from the stance offered by the speaker.

I mention these aspects of rhetoric partly because I will use them to discuss the content of the Manifesto but also because this way of fashioning arguments for the purposes of making political interventions was familiar to Marx and Engels. Bought up in conservative and authoritarian Prussia, neither were strangers to controversy or the potential danger of speaking out of turn. Indeed, they rather thrived on courting public criticism. Both were heirs to a classical understanding of politics that informed educated elites in Europe, if only as a throwback to a bygone era. Each had received a classical education from the Gymnasium, which involved learning Greek and Latin.​[6]​ As a doctoral student, Marx, in particular, was very familiar with the philosophers and writers of ancient Greece. In the 1840s he and Engels spent much of their time writing essays, debating and giving speeches to radical groups and workingmen’s associations. Marx, however, is reported to have been a poor public orator, difficult to understand because of his Rheinish accent and lisp.​[7]​ More importantly, the two were heirs to a distinct variety of rhetorical practice based around journalism, the circulation of subversive philosophical arguments, correspondence networks and the printing of declamatory pamphlets and manifestos. These had been central to the literature of the French revolution of 1789 and were a recognised part of radical politics by the 1840s. Unlike classical oratory, with its orientation towards sustaining civic order, the press enabled swift and widespread dissemination of controversial ideas and arguments, often anonymously and explicitly at odds with communal authorities. As Janet Lyon argues, manifestoes in particular comprise a distinctly modern rhetorical genre, oriented to imagining an improved future by announcing the incompleteness of the present.​[8]​ Unlike the petition, which appeals for recognition by an accepted order, the manifesto proclaims the intrinsic unacceptability of that order. Opposing the assumed universality of dominant values, manifestoes adopt a self-consciously provocative attitude to present, acknowledging the modern view that society can be remade. But they announce this sense of incompletion with a view, ultimately, to fulfilling the unachieved promise of universal inclusion. As such, manifestoes – political or artistic – mark out a distinct argumentative position for an excluded group or perspective to present itself as the prefiguration of a more complete society to come. 

As radical intellectuals and journalists, typical heirs to French revolutionary ideals, Marx and Engels by 1848 were already masters of the neat turn of phrase, summary argument and detailed technical narration, the biting, critical epithet and the philosophical insult. Engels’ capacity for detailed reportage was demonstrated in his Conditions of the Working Class in England and Marx’s notorious ad hominem attacks, merciless sarcasm and relentless philosophical criticism was regularly exercised in, for example, his essays on the young Hegelians or in his lengthy attack of 1847 on Proudhon, The Poverty of Philosophy.​[9]​ The latter texts were crafted for a rather restricted audience of radical philosophers and their style is often convoluted and abstract, reflecting in part the difficulty of doing political dissent in public. Yet their underlying practical orientation to radical social and political reform was never far from the surface. Marx’s experience in the early 1840s as editor of the Rheinische Zeitung prepared him for a wider, less specialised public. By the time they were invited, in 1847 as members of the Communist League, to write the Manifesto Marx and Engels were leading public intellectuals and experienced in writing for audiences, fashioning arguments to get around (and often to challenge) the censor, and mobilising evidence to fit the cases they made.

Marx and Engels were rhetorically gifted but they had something of a rhetorical agenda of their own, too. That is to say, by 1848 they already had a particular argument to make and a desire to make it in a distinctive way. Their agenda had philosophical and practical dimensions – though both were closely interlinked – and their combination supplies the basic thrust to the Manifesto. Their philosophical stance was that of so-called ‘scientific socialism’ and entailed a set of arguments that, they believed, distinguished them sharply from other philosophical radicals, professed socialists and political reformers, and laid the basis for a revolutionary politics based on the distinct interests of the working classes. The content of these arguments are well-known and were set out, but not published, in the manuscripts that later came to be known as ‘The German Ideology’. The essential claim there was that the social structure of property relations supply the vital preconditions shaping all other social institutions and forms of consciousness: ‘what individuals are depends on the material conditions of their production’.​[10]​ Depending on how one sees it, that claim might be regarded as a causal, ‘materialist’ account of how societies necessarily evolve in history or, less rigidly, it identifies the broad social mechanisms that have shaped the emergence of capitalist societies. What is clear, however, is that the claim has a rhetorical function that Marx and Engels continued to promote as a point of principle. Marx and Engels’ outlook was never simply a statement of revealed fact but an argumentative strategy that purposefully foregrounded the substitution of one way of thinking with another. Although there was more to it, the argument was elegantly expressed in the summary form of antimetabole (the reversal of word order in successive phrases): ‘It is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness’.​[11]​ The assertion of the primacy of property relations in social organisation overturned the self-conception of bourgeois radicals as the organising conscience of reform, whether as prophets, poets, or self-organising architects of human emancipation. In one fell swoop, Marx and Engels dismissed philosophical idealists, sentimental reformers, and utopian experimenters as ludicrous self-indulgent dreamers who preferred above all to reason from fanciful concepts and feelings – what Sperber calls ‘lifestyle politics’.​[12]​ With epistemological privilege given to the class structure of property relations, Marx and Engels asserted that it simply makes no sense to speak from any other position. A genuinely radical argument had to reflect the underlying logic of a rigorously examined social structure. To do otherwise was to accommodate the iniquitous conditions that gave rise to demands for reform in the first place. This was certainly an appeal to scientific reason (with its disdain for logical inconsistency and contradiction), but it was also an audacious assertion about what it meant to reason properly. Rational comprehension, claimed Marx and Engels, must ‘begin’ with the ‘real’ circumstances and relationships of everyday life, not the purity of concepts isolated from social struggles for power. Any kind of reasoning that launched its mission from abstract notions of human ‘essence’ betrayed its origins in a deliberation over ‘the material conditions of life’.​[13]​ It resulted simply in ‘combating phrases’ and not ‘the actually existing world’.​[14]​ Such a claim may now seem banal, at least to some, but at the time it required a substantial shift of emphasis. For thought to remain ‘true’ to its origins, as philosophers often argued, now meant transferring the debate from the comforting region of lofty ideals and abstract concepts to the historically contingent and concrete categories of property relations. In short, Marx and Engels thought they had found new argumentative grounds for revolutionary critique, grounds that addressed directly an urgent political problem.

In practical terms, Marx and Engels wanted their socialism to guide the political movements for reform emerging in the mid-1840s around the working classes in Europe. For them, a communist movement, one that reasoned from an analysis of property relations and not sentiments, was different from all existing types of socialism in identifying the proletariat as the agent of historical transformation. The working classes were not mere supplements to change, a mere ragbag of the poor, labourers, and artisans who may or may not take part in major social transformation; as the linchpin of the whole system of capitalist property relations they were the only constituency in whose collective name – the proletariat – revolution could seriously be undertaken. This explicit identification of an agent with revolutionary interests had important implications for how to do socialist politics. Marx and Engels rejected the clandestine model of agitation they had hitherto accommodated: communism was to be an out-in-the-open movement calling for the abolition of private property relations, not a secret society servicing primarily its members. Communists were to make their revolutionary intentions clear to the world. Moreover, theirs was a long-term project to unify different groups and organisations across national barriers. That meant embracing a degree of diversity and building coalitions with different types of radicals and different struggles. The point was to promote their arguments by joining with others, not withdraw into doctrinaire isolation. At the same time, both were eager to ensure that their own movement (the Communist League) remained clear in its objectives and distinct from other kinds of socialist organisation. That, of course, was controversial for those members who continued to be attached to the sentimental socialism that Marx and Engels dismissed. Equally, other individuals groups were competing to lead the struggle for radical reform and to shape the broad movement of opposition to autocracy and reaction that had been simmering for years. Marx and Engels were eager to privilege the voice of their movement as the herald of a crisis that many already felt was about to explode.  

These rhetorical preoccupations, then, were brought to the writing of the Manifesto and are central to its strategy of argumentation. They indicate what Marx and Engels had come to believe radicals should be arguing about and how. Despite having dismissed ideas and consciousness as the philosophical starting point for reasoning about historical change, they clearly recognised the vital importance of argument as a tool of political action. The Manifesto thus sets out to define the situation from the stance of a critical socialism that Marx and Engels felt was uniquely their own and uses this as a platform to define ‘the party of communists’ as a genuine movement for promoting revolutionary politics. Let us now examine the techniques used to accomplish this.

Rhetoric in the Manifesto
The Manifesto is replete with rhetorical devices, some of which had already been employed either by Marx or Engels in earlier texts. The famous closing exhortation, for example – ‘Proletarians of all countries unite!’ – was the motto Engels gave to the newly formed Communist League in 1847.​[15]​ As is well known, much of its historical account of the bourgeoisie was taken from Engels’s earlier journalism.​[16]​ This recycling of phrases and narratives is common in political rhetoric and reflects the way many texts are assembled quickly and with a content that is deemed already fit for purpose. Indeed, far from being fundamentally unique, the Manifesto follows many of the rhetorical conventions noted by Lyon: above all, a ‘hortatory’, insistent technique that proclaims its view of the world with a sense of urgency and transparency. The arguments of the text are in part fashioned to match this format, which connects it to a longer tradition of Manifesto-like interventions in the modern era, as well as give it a distinctive twist.

How should we examine rhetoric in the text of the Manifesto? As I suggested above, the classical structure of classifications and categories in rhetorical instruction provides a useful guide for drawing out distinctive elements of an argumentative strategy. That involves noting the first three of the five ‘canons’ of rhetoric, often known by their Latin names: its choices of argumentative appeal (inventio); the arrangement of the parts of the discourse (dispositio); and the stylistic qualities of its language (elocutio). Let us look at each aspect in turn.

What is the argument of the Manifesto? Of what is it trying to persuade its audience? As a political manifesto, the overt purpose of the text is, as it says itself, to ‘lay before the world’ the ‘perspectives’, ‘goals’ and ‘principles’ of communists.​[17]​ In that respect, it is also a document designed to clarify and affirm the identity of the League. Instead of producing a customary list of claims and demands, Marx and Engels opted for a discursive style that set the scene and elaborated the case for their new outlook, permitting the text to adopt an ironic voice that scorns at the same time as it informs. There are, then, a number of argumentative appeals interwoven in the Manifesto. According to classical rhetoric, political speech concerns the best course of action for the future. That is what the Manifesto aims in promoting revolution (communists, it claims explicitly towards the end, ‘represent the future’).​[18]​ In this, it is logos, or rational argument, that is the primary mode of appeal. The Manifesto famously offers up reasons why revolution is unavoidable and why the proletariat constitutes a distinct class whose interests ultimately lie in disposing of bourgeois society and abolishing private property. But the text is not merely a dry account of social theory or abstract political principle. Rational argument is bound up with a constant and combative assertion of the text’s superiority as a perspective on ideas and events. ‘Communism’, it asserts on its first page, ‘is already recognised as a force by all the European powers’.​[19]​ Rather than fear us, it implies, look at things from our point of view. This notion of communism as an ‘already recognised … force’, an advance guard that sees what others fear, initiates a simultaneous appeal to character, or ethos, that, as we shall see, returns throughout the text.

It might be helpful to look at these combined appeals in terms of their topoi, or ‘topics’. The topics were common formulae for argumentation that classical rhetoricians often listed thematically so that an appropriate argument could be selected for the occasion. An appropriate argument, for example, in a legal controversy may concern whether something happened that contravened the law (topic of evidence), what precisely it was that happened (topic of definition), or how the event is to be accounted for (topic of motive).​[20]​ Stemming from the word ‘topos’, meaning place, the argument lets its object be seen as a particular type of issue and this choice serves as a privileged place from which an audience can perceive the situation. The argumentative topic therefore re-situates the events and issues in question and, depending on how they are disclosed, constrains the audience’s perception of and orientation towards them.

The Manifesto’s appeal to reason begins by interweaving topics of definition (what something is) with topics of cause and effect (how something comes about) so as to situate the present circumstances in a specific way. Thus the text locates communism in the space of ‘history’ defined by perpetual forms of class struggle, culminating in ‘modern bourgeois society’. The latter society is defined by the causal agency of the bourgeoisie, itself ‘the product of a long process of development’, which constantly acts to make things happen: gaining political control over the state, severing ‘the motley bonds of feudalism’, resolving ‘personal worth into exchange-value’, ‘continually revolutionising the instruments of production’, and so on.​[21]​ Social classes clashing and transforming conditions to sustain and expand their material interests, then, define history’s trajectory – an account that is both Eurocentric but also privileges one reading of the French revolution. By analogy, the process continues with a further causal effect: the workers, ‘produced’ by the bourgeoisie, who the Manifesto anticipates will, in turn, develop their own common interests and transform bourgeois society.​[22]​ In this they are assisted by the degradation of wage-labour – its material decline not its advance, as with the bourgeoisie – that compels it to adopt a polarised position against the bourgeoisie and upturn the entire, exploitative order.​[23]​

Thus the reasoning of the first section of the Manifesto defines the present situation as one phase in a wider, unfolding historical drama between classes. This sketch of a dynamic historical movement, with its apparent chains of cause and effect, antecedent and consequence, describes the situation as one of inexorable but ultimately intelligible conflict, rather than a series of mere accidents or unaccountable disruptions to an otherwise harmonious world. Moreover, conflict is treated as an offshoot of fundamental material interests, bringing about collective agents with their own purposes and, in a sense, personalities. This is where the appeal to ethos becomes evident. The account given of the development of the bourgeoisie is not just descriptive; it is normative, too. It identifies an opponent worthy of emulation. Although they avoid moralising, Marx and Engels present the bourgeoisie as a relentless, rapacious agent of change, cynically divesting the world of all residues of sentiment and custom in its quest to expand markets and secure its profits. This is surely the unsentimental and merciless pursuit of class interest they implicitly recommend for advocates of proletarian revolution. By clarifying the character of bourgeois ascendency, the Manifesto offers up a template for how powerfully destructive a social class can be.

That is precisely the thrust of Section II where Marx and Engels shift focus to the relationship of proletarians to communists. The topic remains one of definition but, having established the premise of history-as-class struggle, the text indicates how communism amplifies the revolutionary interests of the proletariat. It begins negatively by saying what communism is not, its alignment being with ‘the common interests of the whole proletariat’ and not any specific wing, and it goes on to link that interest with ‘the overthrow of bourgeois rule’, an echo of the bourgeoisie’s development. The distinctive demand of the communists, it points out, is ‘the transformation of private property’ which it then explains as a social structure of wage-labour and capital. Here Marx and Engels give a reasoned account of the exploitative nature of capitalism. But having already declared its allegiance to the proletariat, the narrative takes on a partisan character not unlike a legal defence in court. Notably, for example, the text turns and provocatively addresses its readers as if they were the bourgeoisie. Invoking questions and imagining both accusations and responses, the text deliberates with its imagined readers by mimicry and irony:

It horrifies you that we wish to transform private property. But in your existing society private property has been transformed for nine-tenths of its members; it exists precisely in that it does not exist for nine-tenths. You reproach us for wanting to transform a type of property which presupposes the propertyless of the vast majority of society as a necessary condition.​[24]​

The section continues by repudiating bourgeois conceits and the wholesome notions – freedom, the family, marriage, nationhood – that serve as objections to communist aims. The strategy here is to undermine potential criticisms of communism by demonstrating the invalidity of their objections, partly by virtue of their limited extension to all cases (hence not universal) and partly by dismissing all purportedly ‘eternal truths’ that fail to reason from the premise of class conflict.​[25]​ All such ‘forms of consciousness’, it announces confidently, will ‘finally vanish only with the total disappearance of class conflict’.​[26]​  Again, the focus is on exposing commonplace ideas and arguments that might soften socialist politics. ‘Bourgeois phrases’ are thus ridiculed and dismissed from the elevated position of a communist outlook that nonetheless stoops to enumerate and disavow them: ‘The communist revolution is the most radical break with traditional property relations, so it is no wonder that in its process of development there occurs the most radical break with traditional ideas’.​[27]​ 

For a text that asserts the self-evidence of its outlook, it is noticeable that the majority of its pages are given over not to demonstrating theoretical claims but to distinguishing its position from others. Having dismantled the phrases of the bourgeoisie, the final sections go on to clarify further where it departs from other ‘Socialist and communist literature’ (Section III) and other ‘opposition parties’ (Section IV). This tallies with the political function of the text – with a practical aim to define and separate off the communist position from others – rather than a work of political philosophy aimed at conciliating different points of view. It underscores my claim that ethos, as well as logos, is a driving appeal in its argument – the topics of cause and effect serve to enhance the authority of the text’s voice, its intransigent stance in opposition to the present situation. But it also means that rational argumentation is inextricably linked to a normative orientation in its rhetoric to foreground and amplify the position of communists as the privileged voice of a historical process. That can make the Manifesto’s view of history seem crudely teleological, especially if we try to read it exclusively as a rational argument. But if we view the argument as a strategy appealing to both reason and character, then its science functions not simply as a description of facts but also as a rhetorical platform to sustain an enduring struggle against bourgeois property relations. As Lyon argues, in the manifesto genre ‘“history “functions more like myth than like empirical historiography’.​[28]​ The force of a historical narrative lies principally in underscoring the rupture it seeks with the present. This requires a combative approach that can take various forms and make alliance with numerous different groups but, because it is rooted in none of these alliances as such, is conceivably prepared to abandon them when they ‘dull the class struggle’ and ‘ameliorate conflict’. ​[29]​

The arrangement of the Manifesto’s argument also mirrors the underlying appeal to ethos that gives it its thrust. Arrangement concerns the assemblage of successive segments of a discourse in a particular order and according to a conception of what needs to be said (or not) and when. In classical oratory, speech was divided into various parts, such as the introduction (exordium), the narration of facts (narratio), the division (divisio), the setting out of proofs (confirmatio), rejection of counter arguments (refutio) and, finally, the conclusion (peroratio). Which of these needed to be included or amplified depended on the occasion and the prevailing genre conventions. 

As a printed document, the Manifesto differs from ‘live’ speech in that it has to win the attention of its audience in its first pages and contain its momentum throughout.  Moreover, as a distinctly modern genre, its structure enacts the type of intervention in space and time that it wants its audience to undertake. It narrates the present as a crisis moment that portends a fundamental breach with history and a refashioning of the future.​[30]​ That requires readers to know, in broad outline, what the situation is and how they are implicated in it. Thus the brief introduction reaches for its audience’s attention by presenting communism as an object of irrational fear (pursued in a ‘witchhunt’) whose identity demands explanation. Section I then narrates the facts, as the authors see them, that bring communism into being. This is a narration that also presents its proofs in the form of aphoristic assertions concerning the historical emergence of modern society. As we have seen, Section II then functions as a series of refutations of counter arguments that defines the communists by their hostility to bourgeois society, culminating in a ten-point list of practical demands. Section III continues this distinction-by-refutation in relation to other forms of socialism and communism. Finally, Section IV concludes by widening its perspective and indicating the presence of different communist struggles throughout Europe, ending its peroration with a rallying cry to unify proletarians. This overall structure offers a disciplined order of exposition that differs markedly from Marx’s often complex and unwieldy philosophical essays. At each step, readers are given something useful: a positive starting point, a simple key to interpret events, definitions of political terms, principles and practical measures, conceptual discriminations from other movements, and affirmative phrases to repeat. Rather than relentless nitpicking criticism of theories and individuals, the Manifesto arrangement addresses simple issues such as ‘who are we’, ‘what do we believe’, ‘what do we want’? 

Finally, we turn to the style of the Manifesto’s language, which is notable for its accessibility and economy. As Lyon reminds us, the manifesto genre typically eschews ornament in favour of a clarity and transparency. In the manifestoes and pamphlets of the French revolution, for example, rhetorical complexity was associated with secrecy and intellectual language with the codes of exclusive groups at odds with the aims of the revolution. The manifesto genre, on the other hand, puts a value on speech that incites action, not deep reflection or deliberation.​[31]​ In the Manifesto, that objective coincides with its general purpose to present and clarify communist principles but also its refusal to get caught up in terminological debates and questions of nuance. The exhortatory style goes straight to the point: it means what it says; it ‘fosters antagonism and scorns conciliation. It is univocal, unilateral, single-minded. It conveys resolute oppositionality and indulges no tolerance for the fainthearted’.​[32]​ The text therefore lacks the misty abstraction of other texts by the authors. But it is no less stylistically impressive for this. Indeed, it is filled to the brim with rhetorical schemes and tropes that dramatise its message, as well as make it memorable. Where schemes work on the phrasing of sentences, tropes (or figures) deploy words and concepts in distinctive ways. Let us a look at a number of these.

The Manifesto exhibits much of the ‘paratactical’ style of syntax common to many manifestos. Parataxis describes the placing of sentences or phrases side-by-side with no conjunctions; an abrupt, unmediated language where claim follows claim with few subordinate clauses or qualifying digressions.​[33]​ Throughout the Manifesto we see this scheme employed variously: in sentence-length paragraphs describing the situation (see the opening section, p. 1); in defining the distinctive features of communists (see pp. 12-19); and in listing their demands (see pp. 19-20). In the first part of the Manifesto, especially, the scheme is combined with a sweeping narration that recounts the repetition of property divisions and their transformation through class struggles. The swift movement of ‘history’ up to the present thus follows the uncomplicated flow of language itself, permitting not only a magisterial gaze across the panorama of class struggles (with all its stops and starts) but also a simplified story of class evolving its interests against other classes. That use of antithesis – oppositional categories – represents, of course, the central antagonism to which Marx and Engels wish to draw attention. It is also the key binary that drives their account of the inexorable character of revolution, which cannot therefore be resolved within the framework of the bourgeois order. Thus antithesis is presented, not simply as an assertion of class against class but, more instructively, in the citation of numerous contradictions and inversions that demonstrate the impossibility of reconciliation. For example, in comparing wage-labour in bourgeois and communist society, they argue:

In bourgeois society living labour is merely a means to increase accumulated labour. In communist society accumulated labour is but a means to broaden, to enrich, to promote the whole way of life of the worker.
	Therefore in bourgeois society the past rules over the present, and in communist society the present over the past. In capitalist society it is capital that is independent and personalised, while the living individual is dependent and depersonalised (p. 14).

These elaborate examples of chiasmus (or antimetabole) reverse the terms of the first phrase, making what is a solution for the first into a problem in the second (e.g. in the first paragraph ‘increased labour’ is a solution/goal made into problem/means). This logic of inversion not only demonstrates a balanced opposition (between bourgeois and communist societies) but also unleashes an internal dynamic that seeks to exhaust the terms of conflict between one thing and another, permitting no middle ground.​[34]​ Marx and Engels repeatedly deploy this technique to undercut the bourgeoisie’s apparent advances and solutions, to expose their contradictions and invite the demand for further resolution. This ties in with Lyon’s view that the manifesto genre functions primarily to expose the inadequate universalism of one outlook and to invite its future fulfilment by other means.

Similar techniques are at work in the figures deployed in the Manifesto, which frequently offers up images of transient objects and qualities. From spectres and witchhunts (p. 1) to sorcerers (p. 6) and workers ‘enslaved by the machine’ (p. 8) who then become capitalism’s gravediggers (p. 12), the Manifesto displays an array of Gothic images and spectral figures to amplify its dramatisation of the tantalizingly ‘veiled civil war’ between the classes.​[35]​ Often things are not quite, or more than, they seem. Moreover, some things magically change into other things: in the transition to capitalism, feudal society ‘goes up in smoke’ (p. 4), expansive ‘universal commerce’ substitutes for narrow ‘national self-sufficiency’ (p. 5), means of production transform into ‘fetters’; in capitalism proper, bourgeois property relations become ‘too narrow’ for the forces they unleash (p. 7), and workers metamorphose from commodities in a market, to enemies of older classes, and then into a coalition against the bourgeoisie, a class and, finally, a party (pp. 7-10). In their explosiveness and destructiveness, these transformations are more unpredictably alchemical than intelligible sequences in a predetermined causal chain. In the Manifesto’s figurative depiction, the evolution through capitalism does not follow a foreseeable order but is the consequence of unstable compounds in an experiment whose elements expand and react against each other and then burst out of all control.

These figurations of class and societal change underscore the Manifesto’s story of breathless change and perpetual upheaval. They serve to produce a sense of the present as a moment of transition, the culmination of a series of explosions set to erupt once more. In this, the Manifesto veers towards what classical rhetoricians viewed as the purpose of ‘epideictic’ discourse – the ceremonial orientation to common feelings in the present that joins the community together. But rather than a commemoration (such as a speech after a major battle), this modern form of the genre looks to the future as locus of communal fulfilment. The present is defined by its excessive instability, the incapacity of property relations to contain the powerful forces its combines. Thus the Manifesto configures a new source of a public unity in the form of the proletariat. This class is a complex metaphor for the variety of workers, their families and supporters, rather than a strict sociological category. It is a class born from bourgeois society but not reducible to it. Here the Manifesto follows the genre by invoking what Lyon calls a ‘transitional identity’, a projected subject of unfulfilled universal demands rather than an empirical subject, with which its readers can identify.​[36]​ 

A survey of the main rhetorical features of the Manifesto demonstrates the view, noted at the start, that its arguments are its politics. Of course, we can still read it as a (partial) summation of Marx and Engels’ theoretical views, a moment in the evolution of their ideas about capitalism. But to do so would be to lose sense of the strategies it mobilises as a distinctive iteration of the manifesto genre in relation to a particular situation. To read it as a form of rhetorical intervention highlights the ways the text seeks to appropriate the circumstances into which its intervenes by enacting argumentatively its own take on events. Undoubtedly that involves reasoned argument in order to describe the circumstances, clarify their underlying logics, and propose and defend a revolutionary response to them. But rational explanation (the appeal to logos) is here closely interwoven with – at times subordinate to – a polemical intent to performatively stake out an authoritative, critical attitude (the appeal to ethos). In revolutionary conditions, perhaps this is about all one can really expect when numerous groups are struggling to define and guide events. From the perspective of its rhetoric, the Manifesto is less a report on events and more an argumentative foothold that its readers occupy simply by reading it in order to assist turning events in particular direction. It offers them vivid phrases and strikingly posed aphorisms, dramatic contrasts and (apparently) reasoned arguments and narratives to apply again and again, all enveloped in an sneering, oppositional attitude that implies its own superior stance.

The Manifesto as a Rhetoric
Like all manifestos, the Communist Manifesto was written to supply its readers and supporters with arguments, definitions and a general understanding that could be taken into new contexts. In this respect, it serves not simply as an instance of a rhetorical genre but, moreover, as a unique rhetorical resource in itself. A handbook for popular digestion rather than theoretical analysis, the Manifesto is itself a rhetoric with a content iterable for the purposes of political education and struggle. Though it may have been written with a particular situation in mind, its format nonetheless permits it to extend a politics that lies outside the immediate purview of its authors. Such, of course, is the way with many popular treatises in the history of political thought. Yet, as the numerous disputes over the meanings of, and methods to understand, historical texts demonstrate, this is not an uncontroversial activity. 

The Manifesto is of particular interest since it has since become not merely a popular statement of Marx’s politics (that Marx and Engels ‘updated’ with new prefaces from time to time as a testament to a past political engagement) but also connected to a wider body of theory – Marxism – that lays claim to a theoretical and ideological project for which the text was not originally designed. That project, which builds upon Marx’s work after the 1850s, has become the benchmark by which earlier texts have come to be judged. From that later perspective, which dwells upon the 1859 ‘Preface’ to A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy and the volumes of Capital, Marx is deemed to be largely concerned with theoretical issues of political economy, the formal ‘anatomy’ of capitalism and the ‘laws’ of its movement.  But the Manifesto’s rhetorical politics are not easy to fit with the theoretical commitments that Marx’s (and Engels’s) later works inspire.  Like other texts, such as the Eighteenth Brumaire or Class Struggles in France, it is overtly concerned with political matters. But unlike them it is not a commentary but an intervention that addresses its readers as potentially partisan and foregrounds its own apparatus of principles and concepts as themselves symbols of allegiance: it offers a digestible but noticeably conflictual account of the so-called ‘materialist conception of history’ (‘The history of all society up to now …’, p. 1); a readable, potted account of the emergence of the bourgeoisie and capitalism (‘The bourgeoisie cannot exist without continually revolutionising the instruments of production’, p. 4); highly quotable conceptions of the state (‘merely a device for administering the common affairs of the whole bourgeois class’, p. 3), ideology (‘The ruling ideas of an age were always but the ideas of the ruling class’, p. 18), and other features of capitalism; a sense of capitalism’s inexorable drive towards conflict and division (‘Society as a whole is tending to split into two great hostile encampments’, p. 2); principles to distinguish communism from other socialisms (‘the communist revolution is the most radical break with traditional property relations’, p. 19); and a pleasingly egalitarian hint at what communist society might be (‘an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all’, p. 20). The aphoristic form by which many of these concepts and claims are made invites them to be read as revolutionary commonplaces, established certainties not hypotheses. They come in the form of chiliastic common sense to be repeated, not tested or elaborately justified in the way Marx’s later work addresses its readers.

Outside the moments of revolutionary advance, the Manifesto’s rhetorical posturing can seem dogmatic and, frankly, simplistic. In part this is because Marx’s later work brought greater focus and complexity to many of the topics he brushed against in the Manifesto; but also because the numerous objects and relations described in that text – capitalism, the bourgeoisie, the proletariat, modes of political struggle and so on – changed in countless ways since its publication. By the late nineteenth century, the Manifesto was an ‘early’ text among others in the library of ‘Marxism’; one that was evidently spirited but peculiar to a particular moment. Outside of that moment, we might say, it seemed all ‘revved up’ but with no place to go, a ticket to a fight that had long since been fought. By the 1890s Marxism had been proclaimed a theory of history, a total social theory that traced the laws of capitalist development in the manner of natural science. In comparison, as the Italian Marxist philosopher, Antonio Labriola, claimed in a commemorative essay in 1895: the Manifesto ‘contains more substantial declarations than demonstrations’.​[37]​ The text may give us, in synthesis, a whole new conception of history, one driven towards a revolution by class struggles, but it does so largely by communicating in the imperative, not as a rational explanation. According to Labriola, it gives ‘only the scheme and the rhythm of the general march of the proletarian movement’ but that scheme has become more ‘complex’ and the rhythm more ‘varied’ than Marx and Engels could ever have predicted. As such, the Manifesto was an inspiration, a revelation, a guide, but nothing more, for those who oppose capitalism. Likewise, the French syndicalist, Georges Sorel, claimed in his 1902 essays on Marxism that the Manifesto ‘seems totally impregnated with idealism, full as it is of symbols and images. Marx could not have treated otherwise a work addressed to men of action’.​[38]​ It was, he claimed, a ‘bizarre and obscure’ text, ill-suited to the deterministic science to which figures such as Karl Kautsky reduced Marx’s teaching.​[39]​

Both Labriola and Sorel were opponents, in different ways, of the deterministic creed that Marxism had become. They marvelled at the motivational force of the Manifesto and the images it employed to inspire workers’ struggles. Indeed, it was precisely this sense of moral inspiration that, for them and other thinkers like them, Second International Marxism lacked, with its appeal to ‘iron laws’ of capitalism and ‘inevitable’ revolutionary collapse. Such reasoned hypotheses, they reckoned, only pacified the proletariat. Their criticisms register a sense of the rhetorical dimension of any political theory worth its salt. For all Marxism’s critique of ideology and the superstructural ‘forms of consciousness’ that distract and obscure capitalism’s inner workings, it still has to speak to those ordinary people ready to be swayed and recruited to the cause. Political action needs to have its stimulus, its rhetorical forms of engagement and provocation that can generate a degree of certainty in order to persuade, if only momentarily, its audiences to make their commitment. Marxism’s record throughout the twentieth century suggests it never found an enduring means to translate its theory into a consistently provocative and motivational political rhetoric, though it has had its moments.

The Manifesto is one form that such rhetoric might take, but it is by no mean the only one. Its combined techniques perhaps work better to announce a new movement, a self-declared dissenting minority that claims to speak for the majority, than to support established political groups and movements. Its clarity and intransigence raise a flag for an as yet unrecognised group and inscribe it within the genre’s longer, modern history of radical opposition. But, once in place, it cannot repeat itself with the same force. Thus the manifesto form has since become the favoured device of insurgent art movements and minoritarian political causes.​[40]​ Heavily reliant on making an impact, its force is more ‘aesthetic’ than intellectual, provocative and punchy rather than deliberative. In many respects it can only promise more than it can deliver, directed as it is permanently towards the future it wants to shape. Marxism, on the other hand, soon became weighed down by its invocation of tradition, canonical texts, and defence of the past strategic choices. From a rhetorical perspective the Manifesto looks like a troublesome text for such a tradition: too confident of its own story, too succinct and irreverent for a work of theory, too intransigent for the sacrifices required to build coalitions and make compromises. 

Conclusion
All political action is premised on judgements and commitments that are held by human subjects with some degree of certainty. But certainty is a quality that must be rhetorically crafted. That is, it is held in place by arguments and principles constructed so as to make us complicit with their logic and affectively bound to their direction of force. The Marxian tradition is no less rhetorical in this respect than any other ideological and political movement. But Marx and Engels employed a variety of rhetorical strategies that addressed their readers in different ways, not all of which necessarily cohere. Marxists have made much of the appeal to reason in their theories and philosophical studies – and for good reason. But the Manifesto adopted and extended an argumentative style designed to force itself onto the agenda at a moment of crisis. To be persuaded by such a document meant not simply to be reasoned with as an intellectual but also to be recruited to an authoritative and insistent stance from which a distinct political project could be envisaged, even if in reality compromises had to be made and other positions tolerated. The Manifesto makes a claim for its readers allegiance not by the veracity of its arguments about capitalism and the accuracy of its reading of class struggles but on the extent to which it positions its audiences, by means of the variety of rhetorical techniques that we have examined, to interpret the prevailing situation from its point of view. 
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